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>> In relation to overarching security strategy, the EU and US havehad high expectations of each other since President Obama
took office. These expectations have not been fully satisfied. Some con-
vergence has been forthcoming, as part of a ‘resetting’ of transatlantic
strategic relations. But the EU needs to set its own priorities more clear-
ly and proactively if it is to make a success of this new opportunity for
the transatlantic relationship. 
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
‘Five years on from the adoption of the European Security Strategy, the
EU carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history’, reads the
opening sentence of the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of
the European Security Strategy. The European Council adopted that report
dutifully rather than enthusiastically. The Irish ‘no’ vote to the Lisbon
Treaty of June 2008, the Georgian war and the financial crisis all con-
spired to nullify any new energy behind the EU’s international role.
When Barack Obama was inaugurated as President of the United States,
the EU was not fully ready to react and reciprocate the revived American
desire for multilateralism and true cooperation with ‘friends and Allies’.
This led to disappointment in the US. But in the spirit of mutual good-
will prevalent since former President Bush’s departure, Washington
showed understanding of the EU’s internal difficulties and patiently await-
ed the tortuous progress towards the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Now that the President of the European Council and the High Represen-
tative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been appointed and a
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strengthened foreign policy machinery is being put
into place, US expectations are high. The choice of
Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,
unknown to most American observers, provoked
mostly negative reactions, however. Yet, one could
ask those same observers how many Europeans
who do not specialise in US politics had heard of
Barack Obama before he became a serious con-
tender in the primaries, or how many in both
Europe and America had heard of Hu Jintao before
he became President of China. Americans must be
forgiven though for placing too great an emphasis
on the President – who unlike the US President is
actually a chairman – and not enough on the High
Representative. The latter is partly Europe’s own
fault for not using the rather more obvious title of
Foreign Minister.
Americans should thus judge the post-Lisbon EU
on the results of its actions. But Europeans must be
aware that if expectations are high today and the
US genuinely interested in partnership, this may be
their last opportunity to prove themselves a real
partner. Otherwise they risk irrelevance. In its rela-
tions with the US, the EU must choose whether to
continue to play the part of the ancient Greeks to
the US’s Romans. The Greeks produced great plays
and marvellous statues, but looked to Rome for a
foreign and security policy. 
A TALE OF TWO CITIES 
With Lisbon in place and unprecedented popular-
ity scores for Obama in Europe, Brussels and
Washington can use the current momentum to
revitalise their strategic partnership, but only if
they rebalance the transatlantic relationship. Both
sides must also take into account that the only way
of keeping this relationship viable is for the EU to
become a fully-fledged strategic actor, and for the
US to accept it as such. 
On the US side, the Obama administration seems
more willing than previous governments to accept
European integration, including in the field of
foreign and even security and defence policy. But
between the lines of repeated American calls for
burden-sharing, one often detects the assumption
that this European capacity will be used in the
service of American strategy. Although that was
the case during the Cold War, when US leader-
ship was ultimately always accepted, the assump-
tion no longer automatically holds true. There
have always been differences in interests and pri-
orities, but with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the existential threat that made
the US security guarantee vital, the EU gained the
political margin of manoeuvre to define and pur-
sue its own priorities. This it did, notably in
adopting its own 2003 European Security Strate-
gy. The fundamental factor therefore is not who is
occupying the White House – even though the
negative effects of some of the Bush administra-
tion’s policies certainly accelerated this evolution
– but the gradual emergence of the EU as a strate-
gic actor in its own right; a new structural factor
in the transatlantic relationship. It is not the
Americans, but the Europeans that have changed. 
A viable transatlantic partnership must be flexible.
In a multipolar world, the EU must be free to inter-
act flexibly with all global actors. Nevertheless, the
US will obviously remain the closest to Europe. The
direct EU-US partnership therefore must be more
comprehensive and more operational, so Europeans
and Americans have a forum jointly to discuss glob-
al foreign affairs challenges. But they will sometimes
agree to disagree, without that creating doubt about
the partnership as such. This political partnership
must be much more than the current ‘summitry’.
Perhaps permanent bodies are in order; in any case
Europeans must speak to the US as the EU. 
The implication is that within such a political
partnership, NATO will become more of a tech-
nical, executive body. It has already lost much of
its centrality as a forum for debate between
Europe and North America. If the EU and the US
decide to act together militarily, they will use
NATO, but primary decision-making is between
the EU and the US, de facto the two ‘pillars’ of
the Alliance. In recent years it is increasingly in
the EU that Europeans take the primary political
decision on whether to act in a given crisis. If mil-
itary action is decided upon, the secondary deci-
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sion is to choose the operational framework: the
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP), NATO or the UN. 
That choice will always be a tailored decision,
based on which partners want to go along and
which organisation is best suited to the crisis at
hand – reality is too complex for a fixed division
of labour to work. It is also in the context of
CSDP that European military capabilities must
be further developed, notably via the ‘Permanent
Structured Cooperation’ pro-vided by the Lisbon
Treaty. Europeans have a capability pro-blem,
caused by the fragmentation of their defence
efforts, which only they can solve, through
increased cooperation and pooling. In short, the
US does need not to ‘beware Greeks bearing gifts’:
a more autonomous and more integrated EU will
truly be a more capable EU. 
HARD TIMES 
On the EU side therefore, the time has now come
to live up to both American expectations and to
its own rhetoric and translate the ambitious Euro-
pean Security Strate-
gy – in reality a
foreign policy strate-







objectives in a num-
ber of priority areas,
in order to direct
policies and actions. On that basis, the EU must
proactively engage the US, abandoning its usual
reactive stance. On many of these issues, Euro-
peans and Americans have different views, but on
many of them the EU has something to offer. It is
up to the EU to bring its assets to the table and
debate with the US, so as to come up with joint
policies based on common interests between
equal partners. In a multipolar world, EU-US
cooperation is more necessary than ever, or the
Atlantic community will face some hard times. 
A top priority for the EU is its immediate neigh-
bourhood. What is the desired end-state of the
European Neighbourhood Policy? Can only
democracy create a consensual value-based com-
munity and thus safeguard EU interests, or will
democratisation create such upheaval that EU
interests would be damaged? Only when EU inter-
ests are clear can a true strategic partnership with
Russia be pursued. In view of their proximity and
mutual dependence in the energy field, Brussels
and Moscow have no option but to establish a close
working relationship. The EU should not fear Rus-
sia, nor should it be in favour of everything that
Russia is against. Brussels must make policy in line
with its interests and priorities. If it can do so in
partnership with the US, it will be all the more
effective. Obama’s outstretched hand on nuclear
disarmament certainly is important in this regard.
So too is NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen’s
constructive stance. But NATO can only ever be a
complementary actor in this respect; the EU has
the means to conclude a package deal covering all
aspects of relations with Russia. 
Enlargement is a second priority. A successful
instrument so far, further enlargement will deter-
mine the EU’s geopolitical position. It cannot pro-
ceed without strategic debate. If the accession of
Iceland and eventually the Balkan countries – and
perhaps one day Norway and Switzerland – is rela-
tively uncontroversial, membership for Belarus or
Ukraine would play a determining role in relations
with Russia. Membership for Turkey would
expand the EU into a whole new geographic area.
Unless the EU aims to duplicate the UN, enlarge-
ment is a finite instrument in any case. Whether
further enlargement is still necessary requires a
careful assessment of the strategic pros and cons,
something which the US must understand. 
Third, as a strategic actor, the EU must also con-
sider its regional objectives further afield. A reluc-
tance to discuss interests and join up the different
European presences, from aid and trade to diplo-
macy, has so far undermined policies towards Cen- >>>>>>
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tral Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too,
such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic, need a
thorough assessment of EU interests to determine
whether or not its presence should be stepped up.
The US will have to take into account that true
burden-sharing may imply accepting an EU role in
areas where perhaps until now its presence has been
rather limited. 
Fourth, EU institutional objectives need to be
defined. The EU must sharpen its view on the mul-
tilateral architecture, reconciling reform – which
will imply fewer seats and votes for Europe in favour
of the ‘emerging powers’ – with increased effective-
ness of EU representation. If the growing promi-
nence of the G20 has the positive effect of
recognising the increasing power of the BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India, China), this can only be a
temporary fix, pending reform of the permanent
multilateral institutions. Is the US willing to sign up
to comprehensive institutional reform, and indeed
to ‘effective multilateralism’, that is to more enforce-
able international rules? These views should inform
a truly strategic use by the EU of its partnerships
with the BRICs, the existence of which too often
seems more important than their content. Rather
than objectives in their own right, the strategic part-
nerships are instruments to further effective multi-
lateralism. The EU should identify shared interests
with each of its strategic partners, in order to estab-
lish in a number of priority areas effective practical
cooperation with those that share its interests in that
specific domain, with the ultimate aim of institu-
tionalising those forms of cooperation and linking
them up with the permanent multilateral institu-
tions. Is the US willing to engage in such a strategy
of ‘socialisation’ with the EU, or will it bypass the
EU as it did at the Copenhagen climate summit? 
Finally, conflict resolution and crisis management
are obvious priorities. A White Book should define
Europe’s ambition as a global security provider.
Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeans
deploy under the flag of CSDP, NATO or the UN,
a definition is needed of which types of operations
European forces must be capable of; which regions
and scenarios require intervention; and the scale of
the effort to be devoted to these priorities. The EU
has played a leading role in the negotiations with
Iran – now is not the time to abandon that, but to
continue its proactive involvement and engage
with the US. Now is also the time to try to revive
the Quartet and forge joint initiatives to further the
Middle East Peace Process. And now is the time for
EU countries to think strategically about what they
seek to achieve in Afghanistan, rather than passive-
ly awaiting US decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The US rightly has great expectations of the EU,
especially now that the Lisbon Treaty has entered
into force. Washington should not hesitate to
encourage the more Atlantic-oriented EU mem-
bers to make the fullest possible use of the new
Treaty provisions. The choice for Washington is
easy: continue to work with a divided Europe,
which is easy to steer, but which has limited capa-
bilities to bring to the table; or stimulate a stronger
and more united Europe, which will undoubtedly
demand a greater say in decision-making, but with
which true burden-sharing will be possible. With
Lisbon in place, the EU no longer has an excuse
not to translate its ambitious Security Strategy into
real strategic actorness. The most successful Roman
empire was Byzantium, the rulers of which called
themselves ‘Romaioi’ – in Greek. 
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